Jameson, Burke, and the Virus of Suggestion: Between Ideology and Rhetoric

Ben Wetherbee



The Henry James Review, Volume 36, Number 3, Fall 2015, pp. 280-287 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

Jameson, Burke, and the Virus of Suggestion: Between Ideology and Rhetoric

By Ben Wetherbee,
University of Louisville

For literary scholars and theory buffs, few bouts between twentieth-century heavyweights have proven as stimulating (intellectually, but also melodramatically) as that between Fredric Jameson and Kenneth Burke in the 1978 pages of *Critical Inquiry*. There, Jameson's essay "The Symbolic Inference" engages with Burke's critical project of "dramatism" in the context of critical postmodernity. Jameson suggests that dramatism, which interprets language as "symbolic action" among acts, agents, agencies, scenes, and purposes (the five nodes of Burke's heuristic "pentad"), is hermeneutically useful but ultimately unfit for the mounting demands of ideological analysis.[1] In his reply, "Methodological Repression and/or Strategies of Containment," Burke accuses Jameson of selective and errant reading, defending his own project as one "designed to strike a balance between the New Critics' stress upon the particular work in itself and Jameson's 'ideological' stress upon 'the ultimate horizon of every cultural artifact'" (411). The exchange constitutes a compelling, if highly standoffish, contraposition of methods between two of twentieth-century criticism's most luminous commentators on the social study of literature.[2] In another sense, though, the aptness of my initial pugilist metaphor is unfortunate. The *Critical Inquiry* exchange, that is, might be worth revisiting with an eye toward what wasn't said—or, more precisely, those insights that the exchange's somewhat combative tone kept under wraps.

I revisit the *Critical Inquiry* interchange here because Jameson and Burke each ought to—and do—still matter. With the recent *Antimonies of Realism* (2013) and *The Ancients and the Postmoderns* (2015), Jameson maintains his prolific streak as the postmodern diviner of literary Marxism, while the idiosyncratic but encyclopedically erudite Burke enjoys posthumous esteem as the perennial darling of scholars in rhetoric and communication. And now, the present special issue of the *Henry James Review* provides occasion to revisit the *Critical Inquiry* exchange in a new light, as

The Henry James Review 36 (2015): 280–287.

it happens that Jameson and Burke are also both provocative commentators on the work of Henry James. This essay attempts a critical juxtaposition of Jameson and Burke's respective visions of James, particularly as each manifests itself in the 1896 novel *The Spoils of Poynton* and its New York Edition preface. Heeding Wayne C. Booth's notion of "methodological pluralism" (*Critical* 24–34), my intention is to illustrate in microcosm the productive tension between Jameson and Burke's critical projects, revealing not how the two critics are "really after the same thing" or represent "two sides of the same coin" but instead how a pluralistic oscillation between their incongruous (if often complementary) perspectives yields a richer texture of critical comprehension than either does in isolation. Booth's sense of pluralism, which I invoke here as a guiding ideal, chases after "a full embrace of more than one critical method" without recourse to self-defeating "monism" or "relativism" (25, 26–28). The point, as Booth might put it, is not who is "right" or "wrong" but what each lens is able to elucidate about a work like James's *Spoils* (32–33).

A third party is required only because neither Jameson nor Burke seemed terribly interested in pursuing a pluralist dialogue with the other. For all its productive insight, Jameson's initial essay on Burke fits the bill of what Booth terms "eclecticism," a sort of faux-pluralism by which the critic appropriates pieces of another's project without necessarily maintaining its integral whole (Booth, *Critical* 21–24). Jameson, in his concluding remarks, "regret[s] that Burke finally did not want to teach us history, even though he wanted to teach us how to grapple with it; but I will argue, for the *bon usage* of his work, that it be used to learn history, even against his own inclination" (*SI* 523). Burke's dramatistic vocabulary, accordingly, surfaces and resurfaces in Jameson's work as a hermeneutic aid that "suitably dramatizes the ambiguous status of art and culture" (*PO* 81).[3] Yet Burke, who proved a persnickety interlocutor on numerous occasions, felt boxed-in, maligned, caricatured.[4] He perceived his own piecemeal appropriation into Jameson's Marxist-historicist matrix as a sort of intellectual violence. Thus, in "Methodological Repression and/or Strategies of Containment," he erects polemical battlements. It is here that one might sympathize with Burke's frustration and still regret that he did not extend a more constructive, open-handed rejoinder. Where Jameson alleges Burke's "strange reluctance to pronounce the word ideology" (*SI* 521), Burke's only countermove is to defensively enumerate his own overlooked uses of "ideology" and question Jameson's overcommitment to the term ("Methodological" 401–07), spurring Jameson, in "Ideology and Symbolic Action" (appearing in the same 1978 issue of *Critical Inquiry*), to finally, and a bit condescendingly, lament that Burke never really moved past the tired notion of ideology as "false consciousness" (418). To the outside researcher, the *Critical Inquiry* exchange and its offshoots appear to have left a bad taste in both parties' mouths. Burke, in a letter to Malcolm Cowley, dismisses Jameson as an obtuse "Yaley Marxist" to be "dispatch[ed] with" (Burke and Cowley 409). Jameson, despite his frequent use of Burke's work, later characterizes dramatism as "oddly, anachronistically, resistant to the kinds of hermeneutic 'second' or 'symptomal' readings we have become accustomed to since the general diffusion of Marxian, Nietzschean, and Freudian versions of the unconscious" (*IT* 164). Burke's Jameson, in other words, is a buffoonish iconoclast. And Jameson's Burke is a handy but outmoded old relic.

If we cannot immediately reconcile Jameson and Burke, we can still learn from their disagreements. Toward that end, enter Henry James. Jameson and Burke each

count James a key figure of American letters, but for pronouncedly different reasons. Jameson's approach to James is relentlessly macroscopic. Stressing his narrative technique and ideology of monadic consciousness, Jameson characterizes James as a historical force and literary exemplar of modernist individualism: "the Jamesian invention of point of view (or better still, Henry James's codification of this already existing technique, his transformation of it into the most fundamental of narrative categories, and the development around it of a whole aesthetic) is a genuinely historical act" (*PO* 221). This "Jamesian aesthetic," for Jameson, reproduces "an increasingly subjectivized and psychologized world, a world whose social vision is one of a thoroughgoing relativity of monads in coexistence" (221–22; see also *PO* 153–54; *MF* 355–59; *AR* 21–23, 164, 181–84). Most tellingly for present concerns, Jameson describes the Jamesian "theater" of psychological realism and the dramatism of Burkean symbolic action in much the same terms, each as a "strategic containment" of language and literature within the parameters of "theatrical space" (*PO* 231–32; *SI* 517–19, 522). In James, the "structural corollary of the point of view of the spectator is the unity of organization of the theatrical space and the theatrical scene" (*PO* 231). Burke's homologous metaphor of drama "is itself . . . infinitely revealing and infinitely suspect: the theatrical spectacle, theatrical space, indeed furnishes the first and basic model of the mimetic illusion, just as it is the privileged form in which the spectator-object finds itself assigned a place and a center" (*SI* 522). In both the Jamesian novel and the dramatistic hermeneutic, Jameson detects an anthropocentric intimacy that diverts attention from the currents of politics and history and into the psychologized space of the individual subject.

Burke, by contrast, localizes his commentary on James to a pair of short, illuminative subchapters in *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950), a provocative study that traces the role of rhetorical identifications across literature, philosophy, and politics.[5] In contradistinction to Jameson's big-picture historicism, Burke hones in on a specific rhetorical stratagem of James's: namely, his use of the so-dubbed "deity of things" in the preface to *The Spoils of Poynton* (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 294–96). For Burke, objects of social and interpersonal value in James's writing, as coded through terms like "vital particle," "speck of truth," and "virus of suggestion," come to represent a special group of "god-terms," or hierarchically supreme rallying points of identification among speakers and audiences (294–96, 298–301; *AN* 119–20). According to Burke, the abstract, quasi-mystical vocabulary by which he describes these things allows James to transform *Spoils*—a novel concerning a tug-of-war between a widowed mother and her recently betrothed son over a set of family heirlooms—into a narrative of more "transcendent" potential: "The quarrel over heirlooms, desired as a testimony of status, attains a higher dimension, as James finds in the objects a glow that can place in them some realm or order transcending the quarrel as such" (296).

We can better understand Jameson's and Burke's projects together by pursuing the nature of this suggestive "glow." First, though, let me posit something of an abstract, contrastive framework around *The Spoils of Poynton*. The two theorists submit James to two lenses, which we might label those of the ideologist and the rhetorician. If Jameson's famous dictum "Always historicize!" (*PO* 9) is shorthand for "always attend to the primacy of history and its ideological constraints," Burke's parallel slogan might have been "Always rhetoricize!"—that is, always account for the discrete discursive resources by which speakers, writers, and audiences align and

divide themselves. I select *Spoils* to illustrate the tensions, intersections, and disparities among these two lenses not only to follow Burke farther down his particular path of rheto-poetical inquiry but also because the novel fittingly exemplifies Jameson's vision of Jamesian individualism. Fleda Vetch, the novel's empathetic, conflicted protagonist is at once friend to the widowed Mrs. Gereth and fellow admirer of her estate's titular "spoils"; ambivalent romantic interest to Mrs. Gereth's son and rival, Owen; and the unshakably (sometimes annoyingly) firm fulcrum of moral propriety upon which the novel's plot teeters. In this character, James crafts a psychologically complex central subjectivity capable of parsing both the beauty of Poynton's artefacts and the folly of those who squabble for their possession. But if Fleda's discerning temperament provides James a tool to comment indirectly on social affairs,[6] she also typifies the sort of psychologized monadic consciousness central to James's modernist ideology as Jameson perceives it. *Spoils* is, in other words, monadically isolated within Fleda's point of view, which is itself both (per Burke) a utility and (per Jameson) a constraint.

Booth infers that Fleda, by inhabiting a "reflective" function for James, "come[s] close to representing the author's ideal of taste, judgement, and moral sense" (*Rhetoric* 43, 159)—a conclusion that Burke appears to share.[7] To appreciate Burke's reading of *Spoils*, however, one need not accept Fleda as James's spokeswoman of moral idealism. One only need empathetically appreciate that principles of aesthetic taste might significantly influence how someone like Fleda interacts with the world. Her sense of taste, in other words, need not be true or right, but it does need to pose feasible grounds for identification with other characters. This concept of rhetorical identification that unites *A Rhetoric of Motives* goes essentially unparsed in Jameson's writings on Burke, but it is commensurate with the project of dramatism surveyed in *A Grammar of Motives*. At Burke's insistence, all "modes of symbolic action are simultaneously untanglings and entanglements" (*Language* viii). The *Grammar*'s dramatistic vocabulary, one could say, attempts to untangle human interaction into discrete, mutually constitutive categories, while the *Rhetoric* knots those categories back into the thickets of social specificity. Thus, in the *Rhetoric*, Burke inquires how James (the agent) can form identifications (the act) around the "god-terms" of material taste—which could be cast as either utilitarian resources of *agency* or, insofar as the narrative space of *Poynton* is indissoluble from value-laden naming of its things, as the dramatistic *scene* itself. To speak of god-terms in this context is to note the constitutive power of material taste over human actors.

It is worth retracing this insight of Burke's in more detail and thus pressing further into James's text. Eric Savoy notes the "quasi-religious" and "transcendent" qualities of Poynton's heirlooms, stressing James's "conflation of the material and the spiritual" when he refers to a "'row' . . . between mother and son over their household *gods*" (Savoy 271; *AN* 123; emphasis mine). The gods/goods pun, whereby a single unrepeated word suggests multiple meanings, represents the rhetorical device of syllepsis, a figure of ambiguity that impels readers to extrapolate a larger matrix of ideological understanding from a single, economical fragment (see Joseph 166). The omitted "o" may, as Savoy suggests, represent "not merely a vowel but the ultimate sign of emptiness [that] tells us what to look for" (271). The same pun, by a less psychoanalytically precise reading, might also exemplify one sense of what James calls the "virus of suggestion": namely, the infectious compulsion to glean mutual understanding, or a shared plane of conceptual value, from the "artful economy"

of limited discursive resources (*AN* 135). By entertaining the notion of "household gods," in other words, readers necessarily breach the conceptual space of aesthetic taste that bolsters Fleda and Mrs. Gereth's otherwise strange friendship.

Early in *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke tells us, "You persuade a man insofar as you talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, idea, *identifying* your ways with his," a notion that later achieves terminal intensity in the quasi-mystical "ultimate" terms exemplified in *Spoils* (55, 328–33). I am suggesting that *The Spoils of Poynton* reads, via Burke, as a dramatization of rhetorical life along what the theorist calls the "wavering line[s] between identification and division" (*Rhetoric of Motives* 45). For Fleda, the godly terminology of Poynton's spoils demarcate such lines. It is telling to begin with that Mrs. Gereth speaks of Poynton in terms of stark, pious ontology, consummate with ritualistic self-sacrifice: "[T]here are things in that house that we almost starved for! They were our religion, they were our life, they were *us*!" (*SP* 53; see also Savoy 271–72). More revelatory, though, are the seductive abstractions by which James's narrator, roosted on the shoulders of Fleda and Mrs. Gereth, describes Poynton's glorious composition. Poynton is a "complete work of art," the house itself a "matchless canvas for a picture," the heirloom collection a "sunny harvest of taste and curiosity," and the composite "a single splendid object" (41, 43). When Mrs. Gereth first exhibits Poynton to her young friend, the two women "[embrace] with tears over the tightening of their bond—tears which on the younger one's part [are] the natural and usual sign of her *submission to perfect beauty*" (47, emphasis mine). The house then reveals itself to Fleda in "great syllables of colour and form, the tongues of other countries and the hands of rare artists" (47–48). Work of art, sunny harvest, splendid object, perfect beauty, great syllables—one notes among this radiant copia the abolition of specificity. Surrounded by such unutterable beauty, Fleda and Mrs. Gereth's embrace amounts to a symbolic merger, what Burke would term a gesture of "consubstantiality," the "substance" of which is this shared lexicon of godly taste—not the material artefacts themselves, but their discursive transformation into terms of transcendence (*Rhetoric of Motives* 20–23). In "submitting" to Poynton's beauty, Fleda submits, too, to an alliance with Mrs. Gereth. The two assent to a common language by way of such ultimate terms.

So it is that the localization of point of view within Fleda's subjectivity is not only a rhetorical device in the traditional sense (see Booth, *Rhetoric* 278–84; Greene) but also a winnowing of Burke's dramatistic scene down to the individual psyche itself—a psyche that then behaves as ideological microcosm. I have in mind, here, Burke's pre-Althusserian notion of ideology as a "nodus of beliefs and judgements" characteristic of a culture such that, "[g]enerally, the ideology of an individual is a slight variant of the ideology distinguishing the class among which he arose" (*Counter-Statement* 161, 162). Jameson—along with other latter-day Marxists of many stripes—might object that reference to the ideology of the individual misses the point entirely, deflecting attention away from the formative currents of history and the constitutive oversight of social apparatuses.[8] What Burke's James does reveal, though, is such an ideological current frozen and magnified. The psychological monad that is Fleda's subjectivity is not really asocial: rather, *Spoils* reveals how Fleda's subjectivity, through the "terministic screen" of aesthetic taste (Burke, *Language* 44–62), comes to intersect with other monads like Mrs. Gereth's and disjoin from others still—most notably that of Mona Brigstock, the uncultured "parvenu" whose betrothal to Owen and prospective

inheritance of Poynton profane the conceptual system that Fleda and Mrs. Gereth share (Foote; see also McBride). These processes of monadic intersection and disjunction exemplify Burke's fundamental rules of rhetorical identification and division. They also dramatize the lived experience of ideological class consciousness—though, again, Jameson might counter that such "dramatization" is precisely what "bracket[s] the act itself and . . . suspend[s] any interrogation of what constitutes it as an act in the first place, namely its social and ideological purpose" (*SI* 514).

Despite the value of Burke's position, Jameson's charge bears consideration. In other words, it is worth asking the question, what do the "transcendent" god-terms employed by Fleda and Mrs. Gereth actually transcend? How radiantly do Poynton's spoils really "glow" upon their discursive transformation? Burke's rhetorical stance is well-equipped to demonstrate one sense of James's "virus of suggestion" metaphor—that is, the transcendent compulsion toward shared inference based on short discursive resources. But viruses do not just spread latitudinally through space: they also adapt longitudinally through time. Jameson's ideological stance, thus, is well-equipped to note how certain "viruses" like Jamesian point of view facilitate certain ideological effects that reflect the past and project toward the future.[9] A synthetically Burkeo-Jamesonian reading of *Spoils*, thus, might stress both the intimate dramatization of rhetorical life implicit in Fleda's interactions and the sense in which the resulting textually inscribed attitudes toward taste and class virally persist through characters like Fleda and novels like *Spoils* (the composite process of which, of course, depends on Jamesian point of view). That is to say, the "glow" of Poynton's god-terms can both consume one's consciousness in the moment and, on a broader chronometric scale, project forward through history.

But this might be too tidy a synopsis. The two theorists' differences in scope and emphasis amount to real disagreements, significant disparities in critical method. But neither, strictly speaking, are these positions mutually exclusive. In *Critical Understanding*, Booth invokes philosopher Andrew Paul Ushenko's metaphor of the cone viewed by different observers from different angles (31–32). One observer, stationed overhead, quite correctly sees a perfect circle. Another, looking from the side, just as accurately perceives an isosceles triangle. The point, as Booth puts it, is not that both parties remain in the ontological presence of a cone but that "each observer of the cone *sees everything there is to be seen from his position*" (31). But for Burke and Jameson, the incongruity lies more in distance than angle of perception. To appropriate one of James's own metaphors, one might say that Burke wants to press his ear to the multifarious "apertures" adorning the "house of fiction," to listen for and describe the ultimate terms that motivate the human drama within (*AN* 46). Jameson, meanwhile, wants to stand back, describing the ideological purpose, function, and transformation of the house itself.

One cannot, exactly, do both at once. But one can train oneself to move more freely, as it were, among the critical terrain. In Booth's words, we can "treat critical modes not as positions to be defended but as openings or locations to be explored—in the traditional rhetorical terminology, as *topoi* or *loci*" (*Critical* 339). *The Spoils of Poynton* can unfold before the critical pluralist as something of a funhouse mirror that reflects the topical positions of both the rhetorician and the ideologist and that suggests the productive tension between the two. Critical pluralism, of course, should not presuppose the inherent compatibility of any hastily chosen pair or set of methods.

Pluralist sensitivity must sometimes recognize irresoluble difference. But I believe Jameson and Burke are more mutually complementary than their *Critical Inquiry* exchange might suggest insofar as each theorist's method can, without recourse to antagonism, help hold the other in check. By stressing the role of devices like god-terms among individuals and groups, the rhetorician can demystify the terms of ideological analysis, magnifying the discursive microphysics of ideological production and reproduction. And the ideologist can pressure the rhetorician not to lose herself in the details—to remember and foreground, as Jameson suggests, Burke's often neglected category of dramatistic "purpose" (*SI* 515–16). It is as easy to lapse into a default position of critical comfort as it is difficult to move between contrastive positions in the course of a single interpretive act. But when the positions are those of Jameson and Burke, I think the legwork is entirely worthwhile.

NOTES

The author offers his thanks to Susan Griffin and the University of Louisville for the opportunity to serve as editorial assistant to the *Henry James Review* in 2013–14—a completely rewarding experience without which this essay would not have been possible.

[1]This essay lacks the space for a thorough overview of dramatism, but for Burke's own introduction to the pentad see his *Grammar* (xv–xxiii). Various parings and "ratios" of Burke's five dramatistic terms motivate the bulk of that study: one might, for instance, map individualism and Marxism onto opposite ends of an agent-scene ratio to describe the hermeneutic tension between the two positions.

[2]See also Bygrave's excellent summation of the Jameson-Burke exchange and its scholarly offshoots, which lead into the author's own project on Burke and ideology (8–15). For further critical recapitulation of the exchange, see Wess (186–216); Crable (303–06); Carmichael; McKenzie.

[3]For further application by Jameson of Burke's conceptual vocabulary, see *PO* (112); *AF* (372); *MO* (10, 219, 317); *RU* (368–69); and *AR* (234–58, 61). In the lattermost, and most recent, of these titles Jameson makes recurrent use of Burke's pentad but suggests that Burke's schema finally lacks the wherewithal to properly account for the role of collective action (61).

[4]On Burke's recurrent irascibility, see Rood, who documents a similar (if less overtly antagonistic) exchange between Burke and Booth—once again, primarily within the pages of *Critical Inquiry*. In that exchange, even Booth's 1974 essay "Kenneth Burke's Way of Knowing," which the author meant as an encomium of Burke, met with the latter's vocal reservation (see Burke, "Dancing").

[5]In his response to Jameson, Burke characterizes *A Rhetoric of Motives* as a synthesis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Marx's *The German Ideology*, the pairing of which revises rhetoric's traditional primary association with *persuasion* into that with *identification* ("Methodological" 403–05; see also *Rhetoric of Motives* 49–59). Burke's brief discussion of James is enormously valuable to the conclusion of *A Rhetoric of Motives* and to the arc of his subsequent career. By introducing the notion of "god-terms" around which groups identify, Burke's section on James also appears to provide the germ for the later book *The Rhetoric of Religion*, which traces a series of deep-seated analogies between religious discourse and rhetorical discourse in general (see *Rhetoric of Religion* 7–42).

[6]On the social import of *Spoils*, see Lyons, who suggests that, among the novel's characters, Fleda alone "approaches to a completeness of being that is the counterpart of the cultural ideal Poynton represents" (70).

[7]Booth's reading is not a point of consensus, and many critics have read Fleda far less sympathetically. For more on the scholarly disagreements over Fleda's reliability as a reflector of James's own views, see Greene (359–61); however, it bears note that James's own reflection on Fleda as an agent of "understanding" and "irrepressible *appreciation*" emits strong tones of affection (*AN* 126–29). Burke, along similar lines, interprets Fleda (unironically) as "the rare character who can feel the magic of [Poynton's] presence" (*Rhetoric of Motives* 296).

[8]Despite Althusser's weighty pronouncements about state apparatuses' *a priori* "interpellation" of individuals (see his canonical essay on "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (85–126), he elsewhere makes a rather Burkean point about ideology and art: "When we speak of ideology we should know that human ideology slides into human existence itself: that is why the form in which we are 'made to see' ideology in great novels has as its content the 'lived' experience of individuals" (152). Carmichael and Wess, as well, each posit Burke and Althusser as harmonious theoretical cousins.

[9]Jameson, who perceives Jamesian point of view as a sort of "tyranny" of individualism, might welcome its comparison to a sort of miasmatic pathogen (*AR* 82). But here, I intend only to stress the communicable (not by necessity noxious) effects of such a "virus."

WORKS BY HENRY JAMES
AN—The Art of the Novel. New York: Scribners, 1962. Print.
SP—The Spoils of Poynton. New York: Penguin, 1987. Print.
WORKS BY FREDRIC JAMESON
AF—Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions. London: Verso, 2007. Print.
The Ancients and the Postmoderns: On the Historicity of Forms. London: Verso, 2015. Print.
AR—The Antimonies of Realism. London: Verso, 2013. Print.
"Ideology and Symbolic Action." *Critical Inquiry* 5.2 (1978): 417–22. Print.
IT—The Ideologies of Theory. London: Verso, 2008. Print.
MF—Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1974. Print.
MO—The Modernist Papers. London: Verso, 2007. Print.
PO—The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981. Print.
RU—"Realism and Utopia in *The Wire*." *Criticism* 52.3–4 (2010): 359–72. Print.
SI—"The Symbolic Inference: Or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis." *Critical Inquiry* 4.3 (1978): 507–23. Print.

OTHER WORKS CITED
Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review, 2001. Print.
Booth, Wayne C. *Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979. Print.
———. "Kenneth Burke's Way of Knowing." *Critical Inquiry* 1.1 (1974): 1–22. Print.
———. *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. 2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983. Print.
Burke, Kenneth. *Counter-Statement*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1968. Print.
———. "Dancing with Tears in My Eyes." *Critical Inquiry* 1.1 (1974): 23–31. Print.
———. *A Grammar of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. Print.
———. *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1968. Print.
———. "Methodological Repression and/or Strategies of Containment." *Critical Inquiry* 5.2 (1978): 401–16. Print.
———. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. Print.
———. *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1970. Print.
Burke, Kenneth, and Malcolm Cowley. *The Selected Correspondence of Kenneth Burke and Malcolm Cowley, 1915–1981*. Ed. Paul Jay. Berkeley: U of California P, 1990. Print.
Bygrave, Stephen. *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric and Ideology*. London: Routledge, 1993. Print.
Carmichael, Thomas. "Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Social Totality: Kenneth Burke, Fredric Jameson, and the Althusserian Tradition." *Rethinking Marxism* 16.2 (2004): 173–83. Print.
Crable, Bryan. "Ideology as 'Metabiology': Rereading Burke's *Permanence and Change*." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84.3 (1998): 303–19. Print.
Foote, Stephanie. "Henry James and the Parvenus: Reading Taste in *The Spoils of Poynton*." *Henry James Review* 27 (2006): 42–60. Print.
Greene, Philip L. "Point of View in *The Spoils of Poynton*." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction* 21.4 (1967): 359–68. Print.
Joseph, Sister Miriam. *Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language*. Philadelphia: Paul Dry, 2005. Print.
Lyons, Richard S. "The Social Vision of *The Spoils of Poynton*." *American Literature* 61.1 (1989): 59–77. Print.
McBride, Christine. "The Plot against Narration: Disavowal in *The Spoils of Poynton*." *Henry James Review* 28 (2007): 249–58. Print.
McKenzie, John M. "Reading Resistance to Kenneth Burke: 'Burke the Usurper' and Other Themes." *KB Journal: The Journal of the Kenneth Burke Society* 7.1 (2010). Web. 25 Mar. 2015.
Rood, Craig. "'Understanding' Again: Listening with Kenneth Burke and Wayne Booth." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 44.5 (2014): 449–69. Print.
Savoy, Eric. "The Jamesian Thing." *Henry James Review* 22 (2001): 268–77. Print.
Wess, Robert. *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric, Subjectivity, Postmodernism*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print.